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KEY INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
EC ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK 
 
Pierre Larouche and Maartje de Visser 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Perhaps appropriately for such a dynamic sector as telecommunications, the institutional setup in 
EC electronic communications law has not remained static. Since the onset of this body of law in 
the 1990s, we have also witnessed various actors taking the front-line position. In the upcoming 
2006 Review, the institutional setup, and in particular the institutional division of competences 
that this setup entails, will again be a major topic for discussion. 
 
The aim of this paper is to survey some of the institutional issues which are likely to come up for 
discussion in the 2006 Review. Some of them concern fundamental elements of the existing 
institutional design, others are more practical. We will first deal with some issues that go to 
substance (I) before going through more procedural matters (II). For each of these issues, we 
consider the various policy scenarios available and their implications.  
 
I. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES  
 
A. The failure to achieve deregulation 
 
There is a clear tension between on the one hand the deregulatory ambitions of the electronic 
communications framework (which was meant ultimately to give way to general competition 
law) and on the other hand the persistence – even increase – of regulation in practice. Not only 
does this create confusion amongst market players, and arguably NRAs; on a wider scale, it can 
point to a failure of the electronic communications framework to achieve one of its core 
objectives: less regulation. In addressing this issue, it must be assessed whether this tension is 
inherent in the current design of electronic communications regulation, or whether it is 
exogenously imposed on an institutional framework otherwise capable of delivering on the 
regulatory objectives. In our opinion, there is a bit of both: the design of the regulatory 
framework does not necessarily give the proper incentives to NRAs, whilst the Commission 
Recommendation on relevant markets – the first “command” which was fed in the system – 
probably exacerbated the problem with its long list of markets (a point taken up further below 
under C.) 
 
In order to limit regulatory expansion, the proportionality test could be applied more strictly at all 
stages, i.e. when drawing up the Commission recommendation on relevant markets as well as 
when NRAs take enforcement action, including the remedies stage. While the current framework 
indeed contains several references to the principle of proportionality, it would be helpful to 
include in Article 4 FD that national courts are expressly called upon to assess NRA actions for 
compliance with this principle.  
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More fundamentally, the ‘incentive-problem’ itself could be tackled. NRAs have very little 
incentive or reason to reduce regulation, since this would imply that they and the regulatory 
framework they are applying have achieved their purpose. Logically, the NRAs should then 
dissolve themselves which, however noble a gesture, appears unlikely. NRAs – and the 
Commission to some extent as well
1
 – therefore have an incentive to find markets which are in 
need of regulation. Here a trade-off could be made between the substantive and procedural 
aspects of the regulatory framework. Since it is assumed that in substance regulation will become 
superfluous once competition sufficiently settles in, there is an incentive for NRAs to use the 
procedures at their disposal to show that regulation is still needed. If on the other hand the 
regulatory framework in substance assumed that some minimal amount of regulation is likely to 
remain in the long-run,
2
 NRAs could feel more secure in using the procedures at their disposal to 
roll back regulation towards that minimum. More radically, if ever a European 
Telecommunications Authority (ETA) were to take over from the NRAs, it would become easier 
for one agency to plan its own demise than for 25.  
  
B. Objectives of the regulatory framework and accountability of NRAs. 
 
Here we wish to highlight two shortcomings of the current regime. 
 
Firstly, Article 8 FD lists the various objectives to be pursued by the NRAs in applying and 
enforcing EC electronic communications regulation. There is however ample opportunity for 
internal conflict amongst them, especially given the absence of any clear hierarchy. How, and to 
whom, should NRAs be accountable for choosing one objective over another when faced with a 
conflict (or, indeed, even in the absence of a conflict)? 
 
Secondly, the electronic communications framework can be called agnostic, in the sense that it 
does not have a clear end-policy goal listed. Contrast this agnosticism with the 2000 Lisbon 
Strategy, which aims to make Europe ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world by 2010’. Normally, one would expect to see such a statement of intent 
reflected or reproduced in the new framework, as opposed to bland objectives such as a 
“competitive market”, “the internal market” and “interest of citizens”. In this respect, it is 
recalled that, historically, the Commission singled out telecommunications as an area for EC 
involvement because the EC was running dangerously behind the United States and Japan. 
Currently, there is a danger that Europe may find itself in that predicament again, with dire 
consequences given the increased significance of the enlarged telecommunications sector for the 
whole economy. Under the current framework, it would be up to the NRAs to heed the Lisbon 
Strategy and avoid Europe falling behind. How can it be ensured that they indeed do so, i.e. how 
can the NRAs be made accountable for the – failure to – achieve the Lisbon goals?  
 
                                                 
1
 The decisions taken by NRAs under the electronic communications framework, together with those taken by the 
Commission under Article 7 FD, provide an interesting field in which to hone certain arguments and give them 
enough precedential value that they could be taken over into general competition law (especially on pricing or access 
issues). 
2
 This prediction is not difficult to make: it is likely that network effects and bottlenecks will always distinguish 
electronic communications from the average industrial sector, thereby justifying regulatory attention, however 
limited. In any event, scarce resources and universal service are likely to remain as regulatory themes even if access-
type issues would vanish. 
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This is one of the thorniest issues – if not the thorniest one – to be addressed in the 2006 Review. 
A single clear-cut answer does not seem possible. Rather, several interlinking changes will be 
necessary in order to achieve the desired result.  
 
As a first step, the objectives listed in Article 8 FD must be better sorted out. Currently, these 
read more like a catalogue than a coherent statement. More worrisome is the inherent danger that 
these goals conflict with each other. Of course, it can be submitted that since a wide array of 
policy choices is to be achieved, this result is inevitable, or even in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, under which it would be up to each NRA to opt for the best compromise between 
these goals in the light of its respective situation. NRAs should then be answerable to two bodies 
for their choices: firstly to the Commission; and secondly to national courts. In the former case, 
when carrying out the assessment of draft measures pursuant to Article 7 FD, the Commission 
could comment upon, or override, the choice made by the NRA as between the various 
objectives. In the latter case, Article 4 FD could be amended to expressly give national courts the 
competence to scrutinize, and if need be, sanction the NRA’s choice.  
 
This option, however, seems problematic for two reasons. First of all, a heightened accountability 
to the Commission, and especially to the national courts, could potentially undermine the wide, 
discretionary powers that NRAs were accorded by the 2003 Framework precisely in response to a 
perceived undue interference by national courts.
3
 Secondly, and more seriously, this option does 
not address the problematic relationship between Article 8 FD and the Lisbon goals. A better 
approach is to reflect the Lisbon goals in the policy objectives that should be the ultimate guide 
for the NRAs in their decision-making. This is likely to require re-phrasing, reducing and 
restructuring of the current objectives. There should be a single core policy objective, or 
regulatory message translating the Lisbon objectives to the telecom sector, for instance that 
priority should be given to innovation or to the rapid introduction of new technologies. The 
current objectives of promoting competition, developing the internal market and promoting the 
interests of EU citizens can, if desired, then be listed as sub-objectives. Having a single 
overarching objective removes the existing potential for conflict or diverging policy approaches.  
 
 
C. The SMP procedure at Articles 14, 15 and 16 FD 
 
The procedure found in Articles 14 to 16 FD can be depicted as follows: 
 
                                                 
3
 See the issue C, under II (the situation and position of national courts) below, at p 12 et seq.  
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Commission recommendation 
on product/service markets
NRA input
Commission guidelines on 
assessment SMP
NRA market analysis
Market ‘effectively competitive’ Market not ‘effectively competitive’
Not impose or maintain 
regulatory obligations
Identification SMP operators
+ imposition remedies
Art 15
Art 15
Art 15
Art 16
Art 16
Art 14Art 16
 
 
 
Two points worthy of reflection emerge. 
 
1. The relationship between SMP and effective competition 
 
Firstly, the Commission assumes, in its Guidelines on the assessment of SMP,
4
 that a finding of 
SMP automatically and necessarily entails that a market under scrutiny lacks effective 
competition.
5
 Conversely, if a market is deemed to be effectively competitive, a finding of SMP 
does not seem possible. In other words, effective competition and the absence of SMP are 
equated with each other. NRAs are deprived from any discretion in this respect.  
 
Yet it is conceivable that despite the presence of SMP the relevant market is nevertheless 
effectively competitive. For instance, the theory of contestable markets would tend to show that 
markets with a dominant player can still be operating effectively if the threat of entry is credible.6  
Conversely (but perhaps less likely), despite a finding of absence SMP it is possible that there is a 
lack of effective competition in the relevant market. For example, in the absence of single-firm 
                                                 
4
 Even though the text of Article 16 FD does not make such a link between SMP and effective competition. 
5
 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] C165/03, points 5 and especially 
19.  
6
 Of course, there is a definitional issue here as well. On a rigorous analysis of market power, the threat of entry (i.e. 
potential competition), in the absence of significant barriers to entry, should lead to a finding that there is no (or only 
limited) market power. At the same time, it is known that, under EC competition law and sector-specific regulation, 
the analysis of market power (whether carried out under the guise of dominance or SMP) tends to focus on certain 
indicators (first and foremost market share) and therefore stops short of a full-fledged analysis. Note that under the 
electronic communications framework, the markets to be analyzed are presumably characterized by high and 
persistent barriers to entry, if they were selected in the first place. 
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dominance, a market might still not see vigorous competition because of an oligopolistic 
structure or of limited competitive pressure due to a small number of players
7
: the ability of 
“collective SMP” to catch that situation is limited, given the restrictive conditions for that 
doctrine to apply. In the former situation, regulation would be inappropriate; whereas in the latter 
situation relying merely on general competition law might not deliver the desired outcomes. In 
any event, decoupling SMP from effective competition might allow room for a more nuanced 
economic analysis to come to bear. 
Adopting a wider perspective, it should be remembered that the real objective to be achieved is 
not effective competition, but consumer welfare. It is crucial to avoid that the acceptance of 
consumer welfare in competition law pure – as opposed to protecting competitors – should now 
resurface in the telecommunications law regime, which is based on competition law.  
 
This option could lead to increased discretion for NRAs – could because it depends on how the 
Comission’s veto power under Article 7 FD evolves. Also, a consideration to bear in mind when 
pursing this option is whether it could not ultimately lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in 
regulation: NRAs have in principle very little incentive to limit their own competences, and an 
increase in competences – through more discretion – therefore can result in more regulation. This 
point links back to issue A, under I (the failure to achieve deregulation).  
 
2. The number of markets to be analysed 
 
Secondly, the market analysis procedure is mandatory for each and every market identified in the 
Commission recommendation. Currently, 18 such markets are listed, which is a fairly high 
number. 
 
We will not engage in a discussion of deciding how this reduction should take place or which 
markets should be removed from the current list. Rather, it is noted that a reduction in the number 
of markets to be analysed has the following repercussions. NRAs will see their tasks and 
responsibilities reduced.
8
 The Commission as well as the NRAs will experience a reduction in 
workload – mainly because the Article 7 procedure will become more manageable or less 
burdensome. The resources currently used to carry out the market analysis and SMP analysis can 
then be deployed elsewhere. Finally, a reduction in the number of markets should also lead to a 
reduction of regulation in general, also linking back to issue A, under I (the failure to achieve 
deregulation).   
 
3. Judicial review of the Commission recommendation 
 
Thirdly, the long list of markets in the Commission recommendation cannot be challenged so 
easily. The recommendation seems immune from scrutiny under proportionality or for any other 
ground: recommendations are expressly excluded in Article 230 EC from challenge before the 
                                                 
7
 What is now encompassed in merger control under the heading “non-coordinated effects” without single-firm 
dominance: see the Commission’s Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] C31/03, point 24 et seq.  
8
 Of course, fewer markets in the Commission recommendation does not imply that markets that are not or no longer 
included cannot be regulated by NRAs. They can, but a decision to do so would be subject to a potential Commission 
veto. It can be assumed that NRAs are not very likely to engage in regulation of non-listed markets. This would exert 
a beneficial impact on reducing the amount of regulation.  
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ECJ.
9
 As the Commission recommendation is in fact the trigger for the entire market definition 
and analysis procedure, judicial review however seems particularly apposite. While this could be 
achieved by turning the recommendation into a binding instrument, this solution ignores, even 
contradicts, the hierarchy of sources found in Article 249 EC. In any event, the case-law of the 
ECJ on the admissibility of challenge from private parties to Community legislation under Article 
230 EC would still present a formidable obstacle to judicial review.
10
 
 
 
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
 
A. The review and veto procedure of Article 7 FD
11 
 
1. The issues 
 
The procedure as currently contained in Article 7(3) and ff. FD operates as follows:  
 
NRA publishes draft measure – Art 7(3)
Commission expresses concern No concern 
1 month
NRA adopts measure
Veto decision – Art 7(4) No veto
COCOM advice 2 months
NRA communicates 
measure to Commission
 
 
 
Three issues for discussion emerge here. Firstly, the need for and/or appropriateness of the 
Commission’s veto power can be questioned. With that power, the Commission is thus placed 
hierarchically above the NRAs – something which might be difficult to reconcile with the 
existence of the European Regulators Group (ERG), which is supposed to function in a spirit of 
                                                 
9
 It is interesting to note that the original proposal for the FD provided for a decision on relevant markets and not a 
recommendation. 
10
 Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95; reaffirmed in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR II-6677.  
11
 Directive 2002/21 of 7 March 2002 (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/33 (hereinafter FD). 
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mutual cooperation and equality. Secondly, it can be queried – as indeed is happening – whether 
the Article 7 procedure as a whole is too cumbersome. As illustrated above, it consists of several 
stages, all with rather stringent time-limits. Crucially, the applicability of the Article 7 procedure 
is the rule rather than the exception: most NRA draft measures fall under the Article 7(3) and ff. 
procedure. This entails a heavy workload, not only for the NRAs (which are in addition faced 
with the obligation to consult with market players as well, pursuant to Article 6 FD), but also for 
the Commission, which is called upon to analyse hundreds of draft measures.12 The third issue 
concerns the possibilities for judicial review of documents adopted by the Commission under 
Article 7.  
 
2. Options as regards the Commission’s veto power 
 
We will run through all options for now.  
 
a. Status quo 
 
According to Article 7 of Directive 2002/21, the Commission’s veto power is meant to ensure 
that NRA decisions do not “create a barrier to the single market” and are “compatib[le] with 
Community law and in particular the objectives referred to in Article 8 [FD]”. The need for such 
a mechanism is not just theoretical: the Commission thus far has already been called upon to 
issue five veto decisions, and exercise informal pressure to ensure the withdrawal of eight further 
draft measures, which otherwise would also have been subject to a veto decision. This can be 
contrasted with the situation under EC competition law, where a comparable power exists – the 
Commission can pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 take over a case from the NCA 
and thereby deprive it from jurisdiction to deal with the case further – which the Commission 
thus far has not needed. The veto power thus seems to correspond to a real need, at least in the 
eyes of the Commission. Further, whereas a veto decision is of course intrusive, it must be 
recognised that it ultimately does not affect the decision-making power of the NRA to issue a 
final decision in the individual case. By contrast, in competition law, once the Commission 
decides to invoke its Article 11(6) competence, the jurisdiction of the NCA is terminated once 
and for all.  
 
Accordingly, one could claim that the current system appears to remain necessary and to be 
correctly balanced, and that it should be kept intact until further experience dictates otherwise. 
 
b. Abolish the veto power altogether. 
 
The existence of a veto power puts the Commission in a hierarchically superior, controlling 
position vis-à-vis the NRAs. This is both undesirable and unnecessary. It is undesirable, because 
the Commission and the NRAs are meant to follow the same regulatory objectives (as set out in 
Article 8 FD) and should therefore be able to coordinate their activities without the need for a 
“hard” veto power on the part of the Commission. The existence – and use of – a veto power has 
                                                 
12  A quick calculation shows that, at a bare minimum, 25 NRAs times at least 18 markets will result in 450 
decisions, without taking into account the fact that many NRAs further refine the markets – either product-wise or 
geographically. 
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the effect of pitting the Commission and the NRAs against in each other.
13
 The existence of 
Article 7(4) FD is also unnecessary, because there are other mechanisms already in existence that 
can be relied upon to achieve the same results. The Commission can, and also does, use informal 
pressure. Article 7(3) FD provides for compulsory consultation of the Commission, which 
provides the occasion for an exchange of views.
14
 In terms of formal enforcement instruments, 
the Commission can rely on either infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC against the 
Member State whose NRA is called to order, or competition law, notably Articles 81 and 82 EC, 
which are often applicable to major regulatory problems (or on both instruments simultaneously).  
 
c. Tightening the conditions under which the veto power is exercised 
 
The veto power can be curtailed by tightening the conditions under which the veto power can be 
invoked. The criteria of Article 7(4) FD, as set out above (barrier to the single market or 
incompatibility with Community law, in particular Article 8 FD) appear rather stringent. Yet in 
practice the Commission does not appear to pay more than cursory attention to them. A case in 
point is the veto decision on the RegTP’s proposal not to designate the Alternative Network 
Operators (ANOs) as having SMP on the market for call termination on individual fixed 
networks.
15
 The reasoning of the Commission on why the RegTP’s proposal would affect the 
internal market or be incompatible with Community law is very cursory.
16
 It is well known that 
the RegTP in its proposal followed an approach which was not shared by the Commission and by 
the other NRAs who had already ruled on the issue. One would have expected the Commission to 
answer the question of whether, why and how the presence of two different approaches amongst 
the NRAs would affect the internal market or be incompatible with Community law. After all, the 
electronic communications framework leaves matters in the hands of the NRAs precisely to 
ensure that decisions are better attuned to national circumstances and that NRAs can explore 
different approaches. The mere fact that the Commission disagrees with an NRA on substance 
should not be enough to warrant a veto.
17
 It might be useful to specify that Article 7(4) FD does 
                                                 
13
 Also because the veto power can be used to considerably curtail the discretion of NRAs. One of the criteria for the 
exercise of Article 7(4) FD is the existence of ‘serious doubts as to [its] compatibility with Community law and in 
particular the objectives referred to in Article 8’. As noted, these objectives may internally conflict. Thus, if the NRA 
has chosen one objective over another, the Commission appears to be able to use Article 7(4) to veto any such 
decision where it would have preferred another ranking.  
14
 This occurs in the two Article 7 Task Forces, set up by respectively DG INFSO and DG COMP. The Task Forces 
have as main objectives inter alia to provide guidance to NRAs on legal or other aspects of the Commission’s 
assessment of Article 7 notifications; and to indicate to the NRAs the likely attitude of the Task Forces on 
substantive issues, and exchange views on any other issue likely to be related to a notification, see the document 
prepared by the heads of the Task Forces at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/news/documents/workshop_electronic_comm_cons_mech/6 
(consulted 22 November).  
15
 Commission decision of 17 May 2005, Case DE/2005/0144, available at 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/commissionsdecisions&vm=detailed&sb=Title (consulted 
on 22 November 2005). 
16
 Ibid., para. 17 to 19. 
17
 See for instance the case of call origination on mobile networks in Ireland, Decision of 20 January 2005, Case 
IRL/2004/0121, available at 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/commissionsdecisions&vm=detailed&sb=Title (consulted 
on 22 November 2005), where the Commission accepted an approach from the Irish ComReg which differed from 
the other NRAs and with which it did not quite agree on substance. In that case, however, the Irish ComReg did 
extend the range of SMP designations further than the other NRAs, as opposed to the German case, where the RegTP 
had rather designated fewer firms than the others. 
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not give the Commission full review powers, but rather marginal review – i.e. a form of review 
where it is conceivable that the reviewing instance would not agree on substance with the 
decision under review – centred on the issues of effect on the internal market and compatibility 
with Community law. This approach also has the advantage of encouraging regulatory 
competition among the NRAs.  
 
d. Transfer the veto power to another actor 
 
This could be either the ERG or a newly set-up ETA. A transfer of the veto power to another 
actor may have the advantage of making its exercise less politically contentious, and thereby 
perhaps more acceptable to those on the receiving end of a veto decision. An issue that needs to 
be addressed if this option is pursued is whether the ERG or ETA can be bestowed with decision-
making power, and consequently also, the issue of judicial review of veto decisions taken by 
these actors.  
 
e. Extend the veto power to also cover remedies 
 
Remedies were intentionally left outside of the veto power of the Commission in the electronic 
communications framework. It was thought that remedies – more than market definition or 
market assessment – were the part of the SMP framework where national differences could be 
best expressed. At the same time, there was also pressure for the NRAs to ensure some measure 
of consistency on remedies as well, resulting in the adoption of the ERG Common position on 
Remedies. In practice, most NRAs – because of national law or otherwise – notify a single draft 
measure encompassing market definition, SMP assessment and remedies, so that the Commission 
could somehow find a way to use its veto power against the draft measure if it considered that the 
remedies were not adequate. In the light thereof, extending the veto power to remedies as well 
would acknowledge the practice of Article 7 FD notifications. It could contribute to reducing the 
tension between the deregulatory goals of the 2003 framework and the increasing amount of 
regulation: NRAs are seen to often impose the heavier remedies – a Commission veto could 
perform a useful check as to whether these heavier remedies are indeed the most appropriate 
ones.  
 
f. Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the options outlined above are not mutually compatible; rather a choice will have to 
be made. Option a) does not seem satisfactory; after all the idea is to improve the workings of the 
current system and other issues discussed supra indicate that there is a real need for 
modifications. Options b) and e) are in all likelihood too radical, and will not be acceptable for 
respectively the Commission and the NRAs (or Member States). While option d) is undeniably 
interesting and has definite advantages, it at the same time is somewhat unrealistic and is not in 
keeping with the current pace of developments – the ERG only having been in existence for some 
three years and an ETA being a very contentious issue as it is. Accordingly, we submit that 
option c) should be pursued. This option is in keeping with the thrust of the discussion in the rest 
of this paper. More particularly, it recognises – and can help to adjust – the heaviness of the 
Article 7 procedure – a clear candidate for reform in the 2006 Review. Also, it is in keeping with 
the original idea of the veto power, namely that this power should not be invoked too easily but 
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should rather respond to threats to the consistency of EC law and aim to ensure the correct 
interpretation of EC law.  
 
3. Options as regards procedure as a whole 
 
a. Status quo 
 
The Commission and NRAs might feel that the procedure is burdensome, but that is merely 
because the procedure is new, and all actors have to acquire practical experience. Once the first 
round of market analyses has been completed, the Commission and NRAs should be able to 
complete the subsequent analysis in a speedier and more efficient way. Also, while the time 
limits of Article 7(3) and (4) FD are admittedly stringent, rapid decision-making is essential in a 
market as dynamic as telecommunications, in order not to stifle innovation and ensure legal 
certainty for market players. Rather than meddling with the procedure as such, any workload-
related problems should be addressed by increasing the resources available to the Commission 
and NRAs. Finally, if the option outlined under issue C, point 2, under I (the number of markets 
to be analysed) is accepted (i.e. fewer markets to analyse), there will automatically be a reduction 
in workload, making any changes to the Article 7 procedure superfluous.  
 
b. Reduce the type and/or number of decisions required 
 
Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons to change the Article 7 FD procedure: the Commission 
seems rather overburdened with the constant stream of decisions from 25 NRAs analysing a basic 
set of 18 markets (many of which are further subdivided product-wise or geographically). This is 
evident from inter alia the standardized replies that are sent out to NRAs in respect of those draft 
measures that are deemed unproblematic in the first phase. Also, there is no reason to expect that 
the workload will decline, or that the Commission and NRAs are simply faced with a start-up 
workload that will disappear. The problem would have been even worse if the Member States 
(legislatures and NRAs) had actually complied with the timeframe originally intended and 
conducted their market analyses in the second half of 2003. The Commission would then have 
been overpowered. As it is, only a third of the Member States have completed their market 
analysis cycle or almost, with another third having yet to begin notifying draft measures, and that 
two years later than originally foreseen. By the time all Member States have completed their first 
market analysis cycle, the early ones will begin their second cycle. Under the current 
circumstances, with the Commission having to deliver decisions under pressure (from time and 
limited resources), the procedure delivers relatively limited added value to the NRAs.  
 
A constructive solution is thus called for, for instance in reducing the type of decisions that are 
subject to the Article 7 procedure. This can be achieved in many ways (not exclusive of each 
other):  
(i)  reducing the class of draft NRA measures subject to the consultation procedure of Article 
7(3). This would imply either narrowing the criterion of affecting trade between Member 
States (which appears unrealistic given that this is shared with competition law), or 
reducing the number of decisions falling under Article 7(3)(a) FD. This can be achieved 
by two – complementary – means. First, by removing national decisions adopted under 
Article 5 Access Directive from the Article 7 FD procedure. The impact of this 
modification, however, would be marginal. A more promising solution would seem to 
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reduce the number of markets to be analysed. This option is discussed above: issue C, 
point 2 under I (the number of markets to be analysed);  
(ii) reducing the class of draft measures subject to a potential veto under Article 7(4), which 
however is not really practicable. Indeed, Article 7(4)(b) FD means in practice that all 
draft measures under the SMP procedure are covered, since the NRA must always decide 
on SMP in the context of that procedure. There is no obvious means of narrowing down 
Article 7(4)(b) FD without reducing the effectiveness of the Article 7 procedure.  
 
Another possibility would be to look at the reform of EC competition law for inspiration, by 
restricting the official interventions of the Commission only to those cases where it intends to use 
its veto power (much like under Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission does not act 
until it actually wants to deprive an NCA of a case pursuant to Article 11(6)). The Commission 
would therefore refrain from systematically commenting on NRA draft measures, and would only 
issue comments pursuant to Article 7(4) FD when it intended to move to the second stage of 
investigation and eventually veto a draft measure. This way, the workload would be reduced. 
Such a construction is already compatible with the current text of Article 7 FD.  
 
4. Judicial review 
 
We will limit ourselves to mentioning two potential obstacles in obtaining judicial review of 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 7 FD. Firstly, Article 230 EC requires the existence of a 
challengeable act. While this is unproblematic for veto decisions under Article 7(4) – they are 
after all formal decisions within the meaning of Article 249 EC – this will pose an obstacle for 
mere “letters of comment” issued under Article 7. There the Commission only adopts a ‘letter’ 
which, it can be argued, does not as such affect anyone’s legal position. Even if a Commission 
measure under Article 7(3) were to be re-qualified as a decision, this would leave unaffected the 
second hurdle, namely that of locus standi. Here a distinction has to be made between the NRA 
and third parties. Since the decision is addressed to the NRA, the NRA itself will have standing 
according to Article 230, fourth indent.  The NRA can also ask its Member State to challenge the 
decision (on its behalf) in which case standing is again not a problem. The locus standi of third 
parties is however more problematic, as mentioned already. The undertaking to which the NRA 
decision now vetoed was addressed might perhaps be able to claim standing applying the TWD 
case law
18
 per analogy and thereby escape the restrictive ECJ case law on standing. But 
competitors who have merely been involved in the national procedure giving rise to the 
Commission decision will see their challenge fail because of the inability to show “direct and 
individual concern” under Article 230 EC, according to the interpretation of the ECJ. Admittedly, 
there is always the possibility of an indirect challenge pursuant to Article 234 EC. However, this 
route is beset with problems. Firstly, it is uncertain as the market party will have to wait for a 
negative – and challengeable – decision to be adopted by the NRA and then hope that the national 
court where he challenges this decision will actually decide to send a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ. Secondly, it follows that this option is also cumbersome and lengthy; two issues which are 
particularly inappropriate in a market as dynamic as telecommunications.  
 
 
B. Functioning of the European Regulators Group (ERG) 
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The ERG, as created in the wake of the new electronic communications regulation, is developing 
in practice as an important institutional actor, the actions of which have considerable 
ramifications for NRAs in their decision-making process (the Common Position on Remedies 
being a case in point). This raises the issue of judicial review: should ERG actions be 
challengeable before a judicial body, and if so, which body, by whom, on which grounds, and 
applying what standard of judicial review?  
 
Here the status quo, i.e. no judicial review, is a defensible option. Judicial review of ERG actions 
would basically not be necessary, as those decisions that actually affect individual operators are 
taken at national level by the NRAs and these are subject to judicial challenge before national 
courts, as a result of Article 4 FD. Also, ERG actions are informal in nature, i.e. they do not 
prevent NRAs from adopting divergent positions. From a viewpoint of legal certainty, it would 
nevertheless be helpful if this position were clarified, since there is no provision in the current 
regulatory framework on that point.
19
 
 
Yet while the reasoning under a) is perhaps theoretically satisfactory and sustainable, it ignores 
the practical effect of ERG actions, notably its Common Positions and Principles. It is very likely 
that these documents will be followed by NRAs in individual cases, for the simple reason that 
they have been actively involved in the drafting and adoption of these documents; and that the 
exact purpose of adopting these documents in the first place is to coordinate decision-making.
20
 
Accordingly, while an undertaking faced with a decision by an NRA can challenge that decision 
before a national court, its ability to do so will be hampered if the NRA can hide behind an ERG 
document. The national court cannot truly be expected to engage in an examination of the ERG 
document upon which the NRA decision is based, so that the practical effect and meaning of the 
judicial review provided for at Article 4 FD is in the end reduced. Some form of judicial review 
of ERG documents would thus be advisable. 
 
The current wording of Article 230 EC, however, does not seem to permit a challenge to the ECJ, 
for various reasons: (i) the ERG is not a Community institution within the meaning of Article 230 
EC, (ii) its documents are not decisions or otherwise acts which are covered by Article 230 EC 
and (iii) the current standing rules for individuals under Article 230 EC are so restrictive that 
challenges are likely to be found inadmissible.
21
 
 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the ECJ/CFI would be better placed than a national court to 
entertain a challenge to ERG documents, i.e. ‘final’ documents that have been promulgated as 
such and are expressly intended for ‘external’ usage. The ECJ/CFI is used to review economic 
policy matters and furthermore is best equipped to take the European dimension of the ERG 
actions into account. Whatever judicial review scheme would ultimately be retained, it ought to 
be laid down in a formally binding legislative instrument to bring clarity, enhance legal certainty 
                                                 
19
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and avoid disputes centring on deciding these questions as opposed to dealing with the merits of 
the respective case.
22
  
 
If for reasons listed above it would prove unpracticable to subject ERG documents to judicial 
review, an alternative option would be to open the ERG procedures and make them more 
transparent. The model of the NPRM under the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) could 
be used by analogy. The ERG would then issue a notice that it intends to deal with a given issue, 
setting out what the points to be decided are, what its options are and which information it would 
like to obtain from market parties and other participants in the procedure. The ERG would then 
build up a file, perhaps conduct hearings, and then reach a conclusion, in which it would address 
the submissions received. The US procedure can be branded monstrous and unwieldy, if one 
looks at the amount of paperwork and resources going into it, but it does force the authority to 
listen to observations and engage them in its decision. In the absence of judicial review, this may 
be the best safeguard.  
 
C. The situation and position of national courts 
 
Under the current institutional divide of competences in electronic communications regulation, 
national courts are regarded as an actor of comparatively little importance. This is reflected in the 
modest number of legislative provisions concerning them and the complete absence of any 
informal instruments relating to them (in contrast to the position in EC competition law). Article 
4 FD, however, gives national courts the competence to decide on appeals against NRA 
decisions, and includes some far-reaching and innovative institutional and procedural 
requirements to make this competence a meaningful one.  
 
Indeed, Article 4 FD was a reaction to case-law where national courts used their competences to 
annul NRA decisions on primarily formalistic grounds, which was seen as counterproductive.
23
 
They restrictively interpreted the competences of the NRAs and often found them wanting, 
leading to the annulment of their decisions.  
 
Still the current electronic communications framework does not at any point attempt to induce 
national courts to see the EC dimension of regulation. There is thus a risk that the actions of the 
NRAs, even if suitably in line with the EC consensus, can be unwound by national courts, if the 
latter’s perspective remains confined to their respective Member States. This danger is all the 
greater, since EC electronic communications law is couched in directives, so that the 
implementing national law often obscures the EC dimension. Thus, how can it be ensured that 
national courts behave as good Community actors and do not unnecessarily – and inappropriately 
– undermine the NRAs’ work? 
 
As a starting point, it is important to appreciate why national courts ended up annulling NRA 
decisions on formal grounds. On the continent, a number of national legal systems do not readily 
admit that independent authorities be given wide, discretionary powers, usually for reasons of a 
                                                 
22
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constitutional nature, namely the primacy of politics (i.e. the principle that major decisions must 
be made by, or under the authority of, elected officials). This reluctance was perhaps not always 
appreciated fully when EC law was elaborated. Of course, such reluctance can be “overriden” by 
the supremacy of EC law, but this does not address the underlying ‘feeling’ in many courts that 
the onset of independent regulatory authorities is something to be weary of and accordingly 
something that calls for strict control on competence issues.  
 
Article 4 FD admittedly attempted to address that problem by stating that ‘Member States shall 
ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account’. Yet, this phraseology ignores the 
fact that even if a court duly takes the merits into account, that is not the sole determinant of the 
outcome of the case. Equally, if not more important is the standard of review. Even if a court is 
competent to inquire into the merits of any particular case, presumably it should only annul the 
decision under attack in ‘extreme cases’, i.e. where the decision is blatantly wrong or 
inappropriate. It might be good to reflect on the wording of Article 4 FD and determine what it is 
exactly that we wish national courts to do (read: what type of final decisions national courts 
should end up with).  
 
Currently, national courts can be induced to ‘behave as good Community actors’ via the threat of 
infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC. The judgment in Köbler24 has made it clear that 
this is no longer a merely theoretical option. In substance, Article 10 EC requires national courts 
to contribute effectively and actively to the achievement of the EC’s goals and objectives, which 
can be interpreted to mean not to unjustifiably hinder NRAs in discharging their EC-based rights 
and obligations in EC telecoms.  
 
In addition, the EC perspective of national courts can be strengthened by informal measures, such 
as training courses provided by the Commission, or an exchange programme for judges. In more 
formal terms, we can look to EC competition law for inspiration, notably Article 15 of 
Regulation 1/2003. While the amicus curiae construction would for obvious reasons be 
inappropriate, the other two mechanisms mentioned there might be copied into the 2003 
Framework. So, national courts could be given the express competence to ask the Commission 
for information of a factual, legal or economic nature. The express inclusion of such a 
competence might assist in raising awareness among judges of viewing telecommunications as a 
sector that has a clear and important European dimension to it. Secondly, if national courts were 
required to notify their judgments relating to the 2003 Framework to the EC level, the 
Commission could then, as it has done in EC competition law, compile an electronic database in 
which national judges can access decisions by their counterparts on the same issues they are 
grappling with. Again, national courts would thus become aware of the fact that the cases before 
them are not unique to their respective State, in turn hopefully leading to a greater degree of 
consistency in judgments across Europe.  
 
D. A European Telecommunications Agency (ETA) 
 
The creation of an ETA was broached during the 1999 Communications Review. There is a trend 
evident in EC law whereby in certain areas, agencies are set up at European level that function 
more or less independently from the Commission and who are primarily responsible for the 
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regulation of the sector concerned. In 2006, it cannot be excluded that the issue will prop up 
again for the electronic communications sector. Two interconnected issues arise: should an ETA 
be created, and if so, what are the implications of the creation of such a body for the role and 
competences of the Commission and the national authorities in the area?  
 
A first option is the status quo, i.e. no ETA. The existing institutional design for EC 
telecommunications seems to operate in a satisfactory fashion. The advanced cooperation 
between the Commission and NRAs, as evidenced notably in the workings of the ERG, would 
make the creation of an ETA redundant. At a policy level, the principle of subsidiarity would 
seem to make the creation of an EC level actor somewhat inappropriate. Furthermore, the 
institutional design of EC telecommunications has been subject to numerous alterations and 
amendments ever since the 1980s and while some measure of experimentation might have been 
appropriate in the beginning, at a certain point a stable institutional framework should emerge. 
New alterations so shortly after the entry into force of the 2003 Framework might thus be too 
hasty, and hence inappropriate. Finally, political difficulties are to be expected: Member States 
will consider the creation of an ETA as an unwarranted encroachment upon their competences, 
and also, their efforts in setting up independent NRAs would thus be rendered relatively 
meaningless. Given political sensitivities, the status quo seems more likely to prevail. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some reasons why an ETA could be desirable. In the studies carried out in 
the 1990s, market parties have expressed a wish for more EC level involvement as regards certain 
aspects of EC telecommunications. The advantages of an ETA seem plentiful. An ETA would not 
be faced, or at the very least to a much smaller degree, with such independence and regulatory 
capture issues which have affected NRAs. As an independent agency, the ETA is also likely to be 
more committed to achieving the internal market, and will not be swayed so easily by purely 
competition law considerations, as seems to be the case with the Commission in 
telecommunications (read: DG COMP influencing DG INFSO). Accordingly, the achievement of 
the Lisbon objectives in the telecommunications sector could be rendered more feasible. A single 
body would be easier to dismantle if and when it has become redundant, which would be in 
keeping with the deregulatory goals underlying the current institutional regime. Furthermore, 
transaction costs for market parties would be reduced by removing the uncertainty as to which 
NRA to deal with and the costs of dealing with multiple NRAs. Also, by entrusting the majority 
of regulatory duties to an ETA, the EC would be more in step with the approach taken in the 
United States, Australia and Canada.  
 
If the creation of an ETA were considered,
25
 some further options arise. The ETA could have 
limited competences.26 Its creation could then turn out to be a burden, rather than a blessing. 
Certainly, transaction costs are more likely to be increased than reduced. It can be expected that 
market players will be confused as to which actor is responsible and competent. There is a danger 
of overlapping competences and of more – unnecessary – bureaucracy for the Commission and 
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the NRAs, as they will have to cooperate with yet another actor, which is problematic in light of 
the concern expressed at the workload created by the cooperation arrangements currently in 
place. 
 
Accordingly, an ETA with full competences might be preferred. In order to secure all the 
advantages an ETA could bring, it would be worthwhile considering a – virtually – complete 
transfer of competences from the NRAs to the ETA, making it the primary actor responsible for 
EC telecommunications.27 The current institutional design has too many actors – Commission, 
ERG, NRAs, NCAs and national courts – amounting to a source of confusion for market players. 
Replacing these with an ETA results in a transparent institutional design, in accordance with 
good governance principles. 
 
Finally, the Commission or the ERG could develop into an ETA, meaning that in due time all 
meaningful competences would be concentrated in the Commission or the ERG. In the former 
case, this would entail a strengthening of the Commission’s controlling powers vis-à-vis the 
NRAs, perhaps even leading to the Commission gaining express competence to deliver individual 
decisions under EC telecommunications. The role of the NRAs would thus become very limited 
indeed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
No attempt will be made to summarize the entirety of arguments set out above. Rather, we will 
conclude with listing some general points.  
- It is clear that the 2006 Review can be quite substantial in nature, as opposed to a mere 
‘clean-up’ situation;  
- Assuming a more substantial review, more than just substantive issues can – and arguably 
should – be addressed.  
- At the very least, the objectives listed in Article 8 FD need to be straightened out;  
- On the institutional side we have shown that for a number of issues, e.g. Article 4 and 
Article 7 FD, the status quo is not adequate and that (substantial) change thus seems 
impediment;  
- When deciding on how to change the existing framework, it would be a good idea to use 
economics for the institutional matters. This approach can help notably with the incentive 
problem of the NRAs;  
- Lastly, the judicial review problem is pervasive: 
o At times, judicial review is entirely absent – as is the case with for instance ERG 
actions, the Commission recommendation on relevant markets and Article 7 
outcomes – and at times judicial review is surreptitious – as is the case with the 
Article 7 notification procedure, where the German veto decision is the clearest 
example;  
o As a general principle, it is submitted that there should a) be only one short at 
judicial review, as opposed to endless challenges and b) that this shot at judicial 
review should occur where the “hunch” is in the decision-chain, i.e. where the 
transition between general policy and (individual) decisions takes place;  
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o Of course, this problem cannot be solved entirely without the realm of sector-
specific regulation; some issues, such as the restrictive locus standi under Article 
230 EC call for EC law-wide changes.  
 
 
